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Polarization of the two parties in the U.S. House is clear, but the intra-
party homogeneity required for different theories of party government has faded.
Party leaders have responded to this new factional insurgence with punishment.
In this paper I ask how insurgent factions survive powerful parties and their
leaders. By examining the member-to-member contribution networks of House
Republicans from 2013-2016, I find an active and defensive House Freedom Cau-
cus (HFC), whose members support one another more than they support other
House Republicans. And, I show how HFC members create an independent
fundraising network to insulate themselves from partisan retribution.
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Chapter 1
Introduction & Literature
1.1 Introduction
In 1991, working to reverse the trend of party-decline scholarship within
the Congress literature, David Rohde (1991) posited that party leaders had an
obligation to move legislative items onto the agenda if there was widespread
agreement within the majority party of the House. He suggested his theory had
credibility mainly due to the increasing homogeneity within each of the two
parties. Today, polarization seems to have peaked and overlapping ideologies
between the two parties members’ are, at least, rare (Theriault, 2008). Despite
this polarization, it seems that the heterogeneity of parties past has returned.
Since their formation in 2014, the House Freedom Caucus best exemplifies this
return of insurgence.1 They can be credited with major policy influence (the
defeat of the American Health Care Act), the ousting of a House Speaker (John
Boehner), and general disruption on the floor (demanding roll-call votes on
arbitrary floor items). If we are to agree that party leaders have increased in
strength since the publication of Rohde’s work, as has been argued by many
1The HFC technically first formed in late December 2014 from a series of private meetings.
But, the faction was not active in Congress until the start of the 114th Congress in January
2015. The popular press covered their formation as a faction, however, see Rubin (2017) for
an excellent scholarly account.
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scholars since (Cox and McCubbins, 1993; Sinclair, 1999; Theriault, 2008; Curry,
2015), we should expect leaders to crack down on defections and disruptions
from rank-and-file members.
In their review of punishment by parties from 1965-2015, Green and
Bee (2017) find 22 instances of punishment, which over 50 years may seem like
a low number. But, 13 of the 22 punishments were handed down by Speaker
John Boehner alone.2 Punishment need not be confined to the halls of the
Capitol though. A recent and specific example best illustrates the electoral
punishments pursued by House Republican leaders. During the 2016 primary
election the House Republican leadership supported the challenger of incumbent
Tim Huelskamp. He ultimately lost his seat.3 In response, Huelskamp–a member
of the House Freedom Caucus–sat on the House floor for hours demanding roll-
call votes on noncontroversial bills, citing a lack of transparency in procedural
processes as his reasoning.4
Given that party leaders have accepted and utilized their increase in
power, how can insurgent factions survive powerful party leadership? To address
2In Green and Bee (2017)’s study, they found that punishment resulted from general
disloyalty, voting against party policy priorities on the House floor, voting against Boehners
speakership bid, voting against rules, and refusing to contribute to the National Republican
Campaign Committee. The punishments handed down were members being removed from
committees, subcommittees, and leadership posts. Forty percent of the punishments were
followed by further disloyalty, party switching, or the punishment being rescinded.
3The only other HFC member to be defeated since the start of the caucus is Scott Garrett,
who lost in the 2016 general election to Democrat Josh Gottheimer. Other caucus members
have retired from Congress, left the caucus, or been appointed in the executive branch.
4Originally reported in Roll Call, “Huelskamp Forces House to Go on Record,” by Lindsey
McPherson.
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this question, I focus on the recent formation and endurance of the House Free-
dom Caucus. Using itemized Leadership Political Action Committee (LPAC)
disbursement data from the Federal Election Commission (FEC), I use social
network analysis to map the House Republican Party member-to-member con-
tribution networks for the 2014 and 2016 election cycles. My analysis reveals
an active and defensive House Freedom Caucus alongside an overloaded and
inconsequential Republican Study Committee. I find that House Freedom Cau-
cus members donate more to one another than they do to non-caucus members
and they receive less money from them. The ability to minimize financial
punishment implies the HFC is highly organized and cohesive in its electoral
strategy. Further, I find that leaders continue to distribute money to members
who toe the party line and are in close races. But, while parties are certainly
maintaining control over growing financial resources, my results suggest that
party leaders’ ability to punish faction members with campaign finances may
be tenuous-at best. By focusing on member-to-member contribution networks,
I demonstrate a new method for empirically revealing the electoral tactics of in-
surgent factions. In the next section, I discuss the literature on political parties,
leaders, and LPACs. I then turn to a discussion of my hypotheses, data, and
methodology. I close with a discussion of my findings and their implications.
1.2 Party Leaders & Leadership PACs
The role of party leaders has evolved with the institution over time.
Scholars argue about how much power leaders truly wield. Cooper and Brady
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(1981) argue that institutional context determines the strength of party leaders.
That is, stronger parties lead to stronger leaders–but some factors, and chiefly
constituency preferences, limit leaders in constraining their rank-and-file mem-
bers.5 Strahan (2007) takes a stronger stand, arguing that leaders are causal
agents who can lead and unite heterogeneous party caucuses for legislative
goals of their own (see also Green (2010)). Each of these works is incredibly
important for developing an understanding of leadership in Congress because
they identify tools of party leaders and discuss the effectiveness of those tools.6
I contribute to this literature by identifying an important electoral tool: dis-
tributing (and re-distributing) campaign funds. I argue that leaders utilize this
tool to both reward those who stick to the party line and punish those who
defect.
Scholars also offer many theories for understanding the role of parties in
Congress more generally. Rohde (1991) (and later Aldrich and Rohde (2000)),
as already noted briefly, develops the theory of Conditional Party Government.
Alternatively, Cox and McCubbins (1993, 2005) present Party Cartel Theory
arguing that the majority party operates as a legislative and procedural car-
tel, with rank-and-file members maintaining negative agenda control. More
recently, Koger and Lebo (2017) present their theory of Strategic Party Gov-
ernment, arguing that parties are fundamentally diverse and aim to serve a
5While I do not measure constituencies or their preferences in this paper, LPAC donations
have been shown to correlate positively with members in close races (i.e. in districts with
heterogeneous constituent preferences) (Currinder, 2003).
6See Froman and Ripley (1965), Sinclair (1983, 1999), and Jenkins and Stewart (2012)
for excellent theoretical and historical accounts of varying levels of party leadership strength.
4
broad coalition of supporters. To maintain their coalition, party leaders may
pin their members against one another for the collective electoral interest of the
party (Koger and Lebo, 2017). What I seek to highlight is very similar; that is,
collective and deliberate punishment of a faction in the name of strengthening
the party and its broader coalition.
To analyze the punishment of faction members I examine Leadership
PAC contributions. Leadership PACs are not the most common way to mea-
sure internal congressional dynamics, but we do know a good deal about these
committees already. They developed initially out of the 1970s House reforms
that deemphasized seniority norms (Baker, 1989; Currinder, 2003). As leader-
ship in the House strengthened, leaders moved to help members get reelected
in return for toeing the party line on the floor; LPACs, thus, represented a
new mechanism to support members (Currinder, 2003). The uses today are
similar amongst leaders; and, rank-and-file members have joined in too–some
of whom use their LPAC funds to signal support in leadership races (Baker,
1989; Mann and Ornstein, 2006). Scholars have reason to believe these support-
ing and signaling activities are on the rise. Heberlig and Larson (2005) find
that member-to-member contributions have increased over time, and especially
among incumbents, which is corroborated by Powell (2017), who finds that
member-to-member contributions are now the primary determinant of advance-
ment within the congressional party structures. Furthermore, LPACs are also
used to support fellow committee members in an attempt to form alliances
(Wilcox, 1990) or even just for personal, instead of party, advancement (Hopkin,
5
2004).
Are Leadership PACs the right measure? Should I instead be using
roll-call votes, committee assignments, or floor speeches? Each of these alter-
native activities are highly visible. And, while all Leadership PAC receipts
and disbursements are publicly available online via the FEC, the activities of
these committees are rarely reported on in the media. I argue that the level
of visibility of any given activity is important. For leaders, using LPACs is
a covert way to punish members while also minimizing any speculation that
trouble is prevalent within the party. Furthermore, Heberlig and Larson (2010)
find that–compared to the contribution strategies applied to principal cam-
paign committees–Leadership PAC contribution strategies are almost always
more party-oriented. Their findings establish firm footing for the use of LPAC
disbursements to detect meaningful dynamics within parties. And, Theriault
(2013) does just this type of analysis; he uses Leadership PACs to understand
the behavior of the Gingrich Senators and determine if they are supporting one
another more than other party members.7 Let us turn now to the hypotheses.
7To be clear, I restrict my data to LPACs for two reasons. First, because I am interested
chiefly in the internal power dynamics of Congress, exogenous factors–like party activists or
party-aligned interest groups–are certainly important, but their effects are not what I seek
to address in this paper. Second, the inclusion of exogenous actors could quickly unravel
this directed study. Once conceding to measure the influence of one exogenous actor, it is
difficult to justify which actors should be included and which should be excluded.
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Chapter 2
Hypotheses & Methodology
2.1 Hypotheses
Factions, such as the Democratic Study Group or the Republican Study
Committee, have coordinated their members and survived independently for
long periods before (Rubin, 2017; Wallner, 2017; Rohde, 1991). The House
Freedom Caucus should be no exception to organizing for survival and a nat-
ural first step is to establish a fundraising network to support their members.
Therefore, if HFC members are coordinating in ways similar to the Republican
Study Committee or the Democratic Study Group have previously, I expect
to find two different things. First, I should find that HFC members are ac-
tively distributing money to one another as they become organized for the
2016 election cycle. Second, contingent upon HFC activity being intended for
intra-faction support, the HFC members should form a dense cluster in the
member-to-member contribution network. If a cluster does form, it is indicative
of an independent fundraising network where HFC members are supporting
one another with frequent and/or large donations. Therefore, I specify the
following hypotheses related to HFC network-level activity.
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Fundraising Hypothesis: House Freedom Caucus members are more ac-
tive in the 2016 network, indicating their need to fundraise independently.
Clustering Hypothesis: House Freedom Caucus members form a distinct cluster
in the 2016 network, suggesting intra-faction support.
If I do detect increased HFC LPAC activity, I must then determine
whether or not their contributions to one another are statistically significant
from any other contributions to other House Republicans. Therefore, I expect
to find that membership in the House Freedom Caucus is significant for un-
derstanding member-to-member contribution behavior. Clearly, I expect HFC
members to donate more to one another. But, I also expect some level of pun-
ishment from House Republican leaders and their rank-and-file team-player
colleagues.
Caucus Support Hypothesis: Being a House Freedom Caucus member
will increase LPAC contributions to fellow caucus members.
Punishment Hypothesis: Being a House Freedom Caucus member will decrease
LPAC contributions from fellow party members.
Collectively, these hypotheses suggest a highly organized House Freedom Cau-
cus and a House Republican Party that struggles to effectively punish its
8
members.
2.2 Methodology & Data
I use Federal Election Commission data on LPACs from the 2014 and
2016 election cycles as the foundation for my social network analysis. Politics
is a network phenomenon and power can be exceptionally difficult to measure
when independence of observations is assumed (McClurg and Lazer, 2014).
Social network analysis addresses these issues by turning a spotlight onto the
relational links among actors. I follow in the footsteps of many scholars who
agree that this distinction is important, and who have applied social network
analysis to legislatures (Fowler, 2006; Victor and Ringe, 2009; Koger, Masket
and Noel, 2010; Kirkland and Gross, 2014; Victor and Koger, 2016). In this
paper, I utilize both descriptive and inferential methods and hope to highlight a
new method for empirically revealing the electoral tactics of insurgent factions.
Due to the nature of network data, autocorrelation is high (Krackhardt, 1988).
To correct for this, I conduct regression analysis utilizing the Quadratic Assign-
ment Procedure (QAP) (Krackhardt, 1988; Dekker, Krackhardt and Snijders,
2007).
Before getting too deep into the data, allow me to note a few coding
decisions I made at the member level. Because membership to the House
Freedom Caucus is secret; I started with Desilver (2015)’s membership list and
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collected information as I found it.1 My appendix contains a table with the
House Freedom Caucus membership as I could verify it. The Republican Study
Committee membership list is available directly from their caucus website.2
Leadership is defined as the roles of Speaker of the House, Majority Leader,
Majority Whip, Chief Deputy Whip, House Republican Conference Chair, Vice
Chair, and Secretary, NRCC Chairman, and Republican Policy Committee
Chairman. As a control variable in my regression analysis, I also utilize 2012
and 2014 election results provided by Sean Theriault and coded as proportion
of winning vote.3
Using FEC LPAC summary files,4 I identified the LPACs that belonged
to House Republicans who were members from the previous Congress or who
were successful challengers running for House seats (i.e. not running for the
Senate or a state-level position). Using a pointed and inclusive method for
selecting LPACs allows for cleaner analysis of how leaders like Boehner or Can-
tor distributed their money, even after they left Congress. Figure 2.1 displays
the 2014 LPAC disbursement network and Figure 2.2 displays the 2016 LPAC
disbursement network.
For both network figures, each node is a member of Congress. Rank-
and-file members are red nodes, party leaders and chairs of committees are
1This largely means paying attention when congressional reporters attribute membership
in their reporting.
2http://rsc.walker.house.gov
3Where there was a runoff general election, the runoff results were used.
4http://www.fec.gov/data/DataCatalog.do?cf=downloadable
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Figure 2.1: 2014 LPAC Disbursement Network
purple nodes, and HFC members are green nodes. The edges of this network are
11
Figure 2.2: 2016 LPAC Disbursement Network
valued, based on total dollars transferred between any two nodes in question.5
5“Edges” in social network analysis refers to the lines denoting a connection between one
12
Due to the density of the network, I have visually removed edge thickness,
but for the calculation of network statistics, values of the edges are taken into
account. These network figures are graphed using the FruchtermanReingold
algorithm, which means that, on average, more central (i.e. active) members
will be placed in the center of the networks.
Both networks feature the nodes of House Majority Leader Kevin Mc-
Carthy and Speaker Paul Ryan labeled and centrally located. These two mem-
bers are raising and disbursing large sums of money in both the 2014 and
2016 election cycles. I have also highlighted the HFC Chairman during the
114th Congress, Jim Jordan, and Tim Huelskamp. Generally, the HFC nodes
appear to be distributed almost randomly throughout the 2014 network. But,
in 2016 the HFC nodes cluster to one side of the network and appear to coalesce
around Jim Jordan. Furthermore, note the sparse number of edges leading to
Huelskamp in 2014 compared to his total inclusion in the HFC cluster in 2016.
Such defensive activity is the motivation for this paper. I discuss these findings
more precisely after discussing my methodological approaches.
2.2.1 Weighted Out-Degree Centrality
I calculate out-degree centrality scores to measure influence among
members. Out-degree centrality is traditionally defined as the number of ties
emanating from any given node-in-question (Freeman, 1978; Borgatti, 2005).
That is, in the context of this paper, the score would describe how many
node and another node.
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members any given member-in-question distributed money to. The original
measure was designed for binary networks, but the measure has been generalized
by Newman (2004a) to allow for the calculation of out-degree centrality based
on the amount transferred between any pair of nodes that are connected. The
logic is simple, larger disbursements to more members means a higher score.
Substantively, a higher score means more influence in the House Republican
LPAC network because the highest scoring members are controlling the largest
amounts of money to the most members. Therefore, I utilize Newman (2004a)’s
revised equation to account for both the number of members distributed to and
how much money he or she distributed. Newman (2004a)’s revised out-degree
centrality equation is shown below.
ki =
N∑
j
Ai,j (2.1)
Where i is the node in question, j is all other nodes, N is total nodes
in the network, and Ai,j is the score from the weighted adjacency matrix
denoting a value > 0 if there is a connection between the two nodes. The
actual value of Ai,j is based on a strength of the connection (i.e. the amount of
money disbursed). Before reporting the centrality scores, I standardize them
by dividing each member’s out-degree score by N − 1. As a robustness test,
I calculate eigenvector centrality scores for both networks. The eigenvector
centrality scores were heavily biased towards members who were receiving a
lot of money from a lot of members. I elaborate on these scores slightly, and
Table A.2 lists these scores, in my appendix.
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2.2.2 Community Detection
Because this paper is largely concerned with the response of the House
Freedom Caucus to punishment, it is important that I am able to empirically
identify the clustering of HFC members. To identify clustering in my network
data, I rely on a community detection algorithm originally developed by New-
man (2004b) and Clauset, Newman and Moore (2004). Community detection
is based on the network property known as modularity. Modularity measures
when communities begin and end by identifying highly dense areas of the net-
work (in terms of edges), connected to other highly dense areas by only a few
edges (Clauset, Newman and Moore, 2004).
The algorithm utilized in this paper accounts for the weight of edges,
but it disregards the directional nature of those edges. I argue the disregard
for direction is not of concern for two reasons. The first is that my main goal
in using community detection is to find out if money was exchanged among
small subsets of members. The directionality of gifts internal to the group(s) is
irrelevant, at least for the question I am attempting to answer. The algorithm
still identifies when resources are transmitted to or from the subset of members.
In other words, density is of concern, not who the connecting member of the
HFC to the leadership is. The second reason is that directionality is taken into
account in my measure of centrality. Out-degree centrality will detect whether
HFC members are more or less active in the overall House Republican LPAC
network; and, community detection will determine whether HFC members were
helping each other more than they were helping other House Republicans.
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2.2.3 Quadratic Assignment Procedure
The Quadratic Assignment Procedure allows for a test of association
despite the biases that come as a result of network data (Cranmer et al., 2017).
QAP corrects for the dependencies of network data and is also an effective
method for modeling the effects of exogenous covariates. Essentially, QAP can
be seen as an “add on” for the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimator (Cran-
mer et al., 2017). Therefore, estimates do not change from those generated
by OLS. But, QAP estimates are evaluated for statistical significance using a
distribution generated during the procedure sans the bias generated from struc-
tural autocorrelation (Krackhardt, 1988; Cranmer et al., 2017). Furthermore,
QAP is effective in producing estimates for networks with dense relationships
(like the LPAC networks) and the logic for interpreting QAP results ends up
being very similar to regression with dyadic data (Cranmer et al., 2017; Dekker,
Krackhardt and Snijders, 2007).
The multiple regression via QAP utilized in this paper uses Dekker’s
“semi-partialling plus” procedure (Dekker, Krackhardt and Snijders, 2007). Dekker’s
procedure allows for more flexibility in the nature of the network data (Cranmer
et al., 2017). Each element in the analysis is an NxN matrix. I run separate
models for the 2014 network and the 2016 network. The dependent variables
are the 2014 and 2016 LPAC matrices, respectively. More specifically, the de-
pendent variable is the number of dollars exchanged between a given pair of
members in the given network. Therefore, the independent variables are also
matrices; these variables detail the nature of the relationship that led to a cer-
16
tain donation amount between two actors. The independent variables included
are theoretically divided into three categories, variables related to (1) the mem-
ber giving the money, (2) the member receiving the money, and (3) the nature
of their association. For each of these categories my model includes whether
the member is in the House Republican leadership, the House Freedom Caucus,
the Republican Study Committee, and her/his 2012 or 2014 election result. I
also include three variables denoting whether both members in the exchange
were HFC members, leaders, or RSC members. Each independent variable is
binary except for the election results, which are proportions of vote-share from
their respective 2012 or 2014 election.
17
Chapter 3
Findings & Conclusion
3.1 Findings
I report standardized centrality scores to allow for cross-network compar-
isons. The LPAC network out-degree centrality averages are 209.91 and 276.74
for 2014 and 2016, respectively. The members with the ten largest centrality
scores for each network are listed below (see Table 3.1).
Table 3.1: Most Active Members in LPAC Network - 2014 & 2016 Elections
Member 2014 Centrality Member 2016 Centrality
Eric Cantor 6968.91 Kevin McCarthy 7621.36
John Boehner 3264.25 Paul Ryan 4035.14
Kevin McCarthy 3230.52 Steve Scalise 3206.24
Paul Ryan 2007.77 Patrick McHenry 2254.85
Jeb Hensarling 1893.28 John Boehner 2249.02
Peter Roskam 1154.90 Jim Jordan 2149.53
Dave Camp 1023.32 Cathy McMorris Rodgers 2082.52
Aaron Schock 1006.74 Kevin Brady 1984.34
Steve Scalise 973.65 Greg Walden 1781.07
Bill Shuster 940.41 Jeb Hensarling 1533.50
The members with the greatest centrality are the members the literature
predicts should be highly active in raising and distributing funds in a party
fundraising network: current and former Speakers, House Majority leaders, and
18
many other leaders and senior members (Powell, 2017; Currinder, 2008). HFC
Chairman Jim Jordan, who is the sixth most active member in the 2016 LPAC
network, presents one exception to this pattern. As we will see, this is not the
level of fundraising he was involved in before the establishment of the HFC
and this only further underscores a need to investigate the faction’s activity.
The House Freedom Caucus centrality score averages are 39.21 and
105.58 for 2014 and 2016, respectively. Furthermore, it is critical to keep in
mind that the HFC did not formally exist as a caucus during the 2014 election
cycle. Of the HFC members I have identified (n=41), 28 members (68%) had
an LPAC in the 2014 cycle and 33 members (80%) had an LPAC in the 2016
cycle. The fact that 68% of caucus members had an LPAC in 2014 implies the
infrastructure to create an independent fundraising network. From the 2016
network, we see that infrastructure put to work.
Five members created LPACs for the 2016 election cycle and three
more members established LPACs immediately upon taking office and joining
the HFC. Overall, caucus aggregate activity noticeably increases in the 2016
network. The sum of net differences between 2016 and 2014 activity is 2489.94
(see Table 3.2), which is positive and relatively large–indicating an increase in
activity. Six members have net differences greater than 50.00 (and only three
members with net differences greater than -50.00). Individual HFC members
had centrality scores 75.45 higher in 2016, on average. Centrality scores of 0 are
the result of members contributing their LPAC funds to outsiders challenging
establishment politicians, or they just contributed money to members not in
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the network. It appears that much of the coordination for the defense of the
caucus was delegated to Chairman Jim Jordan whose centrality score is a large
outlier within the caucus. Still, on balance, HFC members were more active
in the 2016 House Republican LPAC network than they were in 2014 (before
becoming a caucus)–providing evidence for the Fundraising Hypothesis.
Having established that HFC members were more active in 2016, were
they supporting each other more than other House Republicans? I address
this question using community detection (see Table 3.3 and Table 3.4). The
communities are numbered arbitrarily and each following column is the number
of members for that respective affiliation.1 The final column is the total number
of members in each community. The 2014 network has two outlier groups of
one member each, but otherwise the networks are very similar.
In the 2014 network, 19 HFC members are in the first (and largest)
community, which I will refer to as the core community. Examining the core
community, it is immediately apparent that its membership is very hetero-
geneous. In addition to the 19 HFC members, there are also 14 unaffiliated
rank-and-file members, 53 RSC members, and 3 leaders (Eric Cantor, Patrick
McHenry, and Steve Scalise). The core community does not seem to have any
immediately apparent exogenous linkages among its members. The remaining
HFC members are distributed throughout the rest of the communities, each of
which is made up of a seemingly random collections of rank-and-file members,
1Affiliations are not mutually exclusive. That is, RSC members may also be HFC members,
leaders may also be RSC members, etc.
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as well as leaders. Community detection tends to have two extremes, networks
with clear socially identifiable clusters and networks where nodes seem to asso-
ciate randomly (Shizuka and Farine, 2016). The heterogeneous nature of the
communities in the 2014 network suggests the latter is occurring. Further, it
seems that the community detection algorithms utilized here are particularly
bad at knowing where to place highly central memberssince those members
are so connected and so central to the network.
Looking at the 2016 communities (see Table 3.4), HFC members appear
to cluster in about the same way. At a first glance such clustering may seem
to imply that their activity was not systematically different in 2016. Upon
closer investigation of the composition of community 5 (hereafter the HFC
community), we see that 87% of its membership is HFC members (see Ta-
ble 3.5). Looking at the HFC community, names in bold are not members
of the HFC. Pete Sessions is an RSC member and the Chair of the Rules
Committee; Thomas Massie and Daniel Webster have no faction or leadership
affiliations. It is possible that these members are actually part of the HFC
but since membership is secret we cannot know for sure. Nine of the 20 HFC
members in the HFC community are also RSC members.
The HFC community is organized around the contributions of the House
Freedom Caucus. The caucus chairman, Jim Jordan, is the most central member
of the community. The HFC community provides clear support for the Cluster-
ing Hypothesis. But, what is Pete Sessions, Rules Committee Chairman, doing
in this community? It appears, of his 30 LPAC contributions, most went to
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rank-and-file members with close reelection races (as predicted by Currinder,
2003), but he also donated to well-known conservatives. These contributions
include donations to Tim Huelskamp (HFC), Daniel Webster (who ran against
Boehner for Speaker), and Mark Walker (RSC Chairman in the 115th Congress).
While one might be tempted to peg these contributions as Sessions’ personal
indulgence for his ideology, I instead suspect that Sessions is protecting his
own self-interest as Rules Committee Chairman. If a full-blown revolution does
happen and HFC members continue gaining power, they may be inclined to
keep Sessions in a leadership/leadership-adjacent position if he donates to their
members–especially if it is against the wishes of current leadership. Sessions
disbursements are in line with Baker (1989) and Mann and Ornstein (2006),
who argue that LPAC contributions signal support in leadership races.
Turning to the inferential analysis (see Table 3.6), recall that the HFC
did not formally exist during the 2014 election cycle.2 Despite not formally
existing, future faction members still knew and supported one another as co-
partisans attempting to maintain their majority party status. If so, we should
expect some interaction between HFC members in 2014, but we should see
significantly more after the faction’s formation.
Being a member of the House Freedom Caucus, on average, is not finan-
cially fruitful. HFC members are giving and receiving less money. The data
2Recall that the reported standard errors are unreliable and are not used to evaluate
significance of the estimates (Krackhardt, 1988). Significance is evaluated based on a distri-
bution of estimates produced during the semi-partialling plus permutation process (Cranmer
et al., 2017).
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show that members of the HFC were already receiving less money than other
House Republicans before faction formation, but the Receiver-HFC coefficient
doubles in 2016. Being a member of the HFC means receiving almost $300
less than the average member in the 2016 LPAC network. The doubling of
the receiver coefficient from 2014 to 2016 could be interpreted as punishment
within the LPAC network more generally and provide evidence in favor of
the Punishment Hypothesis. At minimum, though, the difference implies that
formalization of the faction exacerbated the trend of Republicans generally
withholding money from these members. Unsurprisingly, HFC members were
giving to one another more than other House Republicans in 2014. But, after
faction formation, the HFC member receiving money went from receiving about
$200 more to about $800 more. That is, HFC members were giving about four
times as much money to one another in 2016, providing evidence for the Caucus
Support Hypothesis.
Party leaders receive about $200 less on average in 2016, but leaders also
give about $2200 more on average (about $300 more than in 2014). Leaders
giving significantly more than the average member is certainly in line with the
underlying fundraising requirements for being a leader (Powell, 2017; Currinder,
2008). It also makes sense that leaders may not be receiving most of their money
via LPACs. Even though the rank-and-file are expected to contribute to the
party’s wellbeing when possible (Heberlig and Larson, 2005), members raise
money for the party in many ways (Powell, 2017). When both members are
leaders the relationship is negative, implying that leaders are not donating to
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one another at unusual levels.
Since the HFC formed as a split-off from the Republican Study Com-
mittee (Wallner, 2017; Rubin, 2017), I included membership in the RSC as
explanatory variables as well. The RSC variables were statistically insignificant
across both models. With no clear financial relationship, it is possible that this
lackluster electoral support was another reason the HFC split from the group.
The last set of results addresses electoral safety. The safer a member
is, the more likely she is to donate to her fellow party members in 2016. Safer
members donate nearly $700 more and this makes sense since these members
are still expected to raise money for the party, but they do not necessarily need
to spend it on their own races. More vulnerable members are not donating
money to other members, most likely because they need to spend every penny
they can get on their own races.
3.2 Conclusion
The analysis reveals an active and defensive House Freedom Caucus
alongside an overloaded and inconsequential Republican Study Committee. I
find that HFC members became more active in member-to-member contribu-
tions after they formed their faction. And, HFC members used their LPAC
funds to support one another more than to support other House Republicans.
I also find evidence that House Republicans punished HFC members, but the
HFC clearly worked to minimize the damage. The ability to minimize finan-
cial punishment implies the House Freedom Caucus is highly organized and
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cohesive in its electoral strategy. Therefore, it makes sense to expect the HFC
to continue injecting its members into major policy debates, making demands
of leadership, and recruiting like-minded members. To be clear, I have not
illuminated the entire story of faction survival with only member-to-member
contributions; the HFC almost certainly utilized independent expenditures and
coordinated policy statements to distinguish its members as unique candidates
for reelection in the 2016 election cycle. This paper serves as a first step in
demonstrating a new method for scholars to empirically reveal the electoral
tactics of insurgent factions.
In addition to my findings about factions, I also find that House Repub-
lican leaders remain active fundraisers. Leaders continue to distribute money
to members who toe the party line and are in close races. The distribution of
campaign funds is clearly a tool leaders can use to reward or punish members.
While the literature on congressional leaders (and parties) may have previously
seen financial control over party money as a major tool (Strahan, 2007; Koger
and Lebo, 2017), I argue the findings in this paper should indicate a more
nuanced conclusion. Certainly, leaders continue to raise and receive funds for
their loyal partisan members. But, the ability of party leaders to punish mem-
bers who are part of organized factions with their party finance tool may be
weak–at best.
25
Table 3.2: House Freedom Caucus Weighted Out-Degree Centrality Scores
Member 2016 Centrality 2014 Centrality Net 2016 Centrality
Jim Jordan 2149.53 56.99 2092.54
Keith Rothfus 185.44 No LPAC 185.44
Gary Palmer 165.53 Not an MC 165.53
Brian Babin 135.92 Not an MC 135.92
Bill Posey 98.06 0.00 98.06
Scott DesJarlais 116.50 56.99 59.51
Louie Gohmert 48.54 0.00 48.54
David Schweikert 87.38 56.99 30.38
Mo Brooks 43.69 15.54 28.15
Paul Gosar 23.06 0.00 23.06
Ted Yoho 24.27 2.59 21.68
Tim Huelskamp 14.56 0.00 14.56
Mark Sanford 13.11 No LPAC 13.11
Matt Salmon 53.40 41.45 11.95
Dave Brat 9.71 Freshman MC 9.71
Alexander Mooney 4.85 No LPAC 4.85
Cynthia Lummis 2.43 0.00 2.43
Jim Bridenstine 0.00 No LPAC 0.00
Mark Meadows 0.00 No LPAC 0.00
Jody Hice 0.00 0.00 0.00
Stevan Pearce 0.00 0.00 0.00
Curt Clawson 0.00 0.00 0.00
Tom McClintock 0.00 0.00 0.00
Scott Perry 0.00 0.00 0.00
Randy Weber 0.00 0.00 0.00
Morgan Griffith 26.70 26.94 −0.24
Mick Mulvaney 0.00 5.18 −5.18
John Fleming 33.98 41.45 −7.47
Jeff Duncan 0.00 20.73 −20.73
Justin Amash 31.07 58.03 −26.96
Andy Harris 19.42 72.54 −53.12
Reid Ribble 39.32 198.96 −159.64
Scott Garrett 157.77 339.90 −182.13
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Table 3.3: Communities Detected in 2014 LPAC Network
Community Leadership HFC RSC Unaffiliated Community Members
1 3 19 53 14 70
2 2 2 36 16 53
3 0 2 13 8 21
4 1 3 16 7 24
5 3 2 15 8 24
6 0 0 0 1 1
7 0 0 1 0 1
Total 9 27 134 54 194
Table 3.4: Communities Detected in 2016 LPAC Network
Community Leadership HFC RSC Unaffiliated Community Members
1 3 6 39 23 69
2 3 0 15 13 29
3 2 6 18 9 32
4 2 1 24 23 54
5 0 20 10 2 23
Total 10 33 106 70 207
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Table 3.5: House Freedom Caucus Community Membership (2016)
Member Out-Degree Centrality
Jim Jordan 2149.53
Pete Sessions 440.73
Gary Palmer 165.53
Scott Garrett 157.77
Brian Babin 135.92
Scott DesJarlais 116.50
Bill Posey 98.06
David Schweikert 87.38
Matt Salmon 53.40
Louie Gohmert 48.54
Mo Brooks 43.69
John Fleming 33.98
Justin Amash 31.07
Ted Yoho 24.27
Paul Gosar 23.06
Tim Huelskamp 14.56
Daniel Webster 14.56
Dave Brat 9.71
Jim Bridenstine 0.00
Mark Meadows 0.00
Jody Hice 0.00
Curt Clawson 0.00
Thomas Massie 0.00
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Table 3.6: Effects on Member-to-Member Giving within the House Republican
Party
2014 Network 2016 Network
Giver-HFC −123.03∗∗ −217.82∗∗
(17.98) (22.84)
Giver-Leader 1882.37∗∗ 2257.92∗∗
(29.27) (36.51)
Giver-RSC −42.37 1.95
(22.75) (22.11)
Receiver-HFC −135.64∗∗ −277.86∗∗
(17.98) (22.84)
Receiver-Leader 126.48 −196.98∗
(29.27) (36.51)
Receiver-RSC −67.18 −80.20
(22.75) (22.11)
Both HFC 179.10∗∗ 785.64∗∗
(46.59) (56.31)
Both Leaders −220.63 −1125.36∗∗
(140.48) (163.68)
Both RSC 43.39 −22.83
(27.16) (30.70)
Giver Electoral Safety 62.20 645.00∗∗
(52.81) (66.99)
Receiver Electoral Safety −871.91∗∗ −1375.83∗∗
(52.81) (66.99)
Intercept 741.81∗∗ 783.54∗∗
(51.84) (66.18)
Adjusted R2 0.104 0.121
N 34969 41209
Standard errors beneath coefficients; *p < .05, **p < .01
29
Appendices
30
Appendix A
Appendix
A.0.1 House Freedom Caucus Members
Table A.1: Members of the House Freedom Caucus (114th Congress)
Member District Member District
Amash, Justin MI-3 Labrador, Raul ID-1
Babin, Brian TX-26 Loudermilk, Barry GA-11
Blum, Rod IA-1 Lummis, Cynthia WY-At Large
Brat, David VA-7 Meadows, Mark NC-11
Bridenstine, Jim OK-1 McClintock, Tom CA-4
Brooks, Mo AL-5 Mooney, Alex WV-2
Buck, Ken CO-4 Mulvaney, Mick SC-5
Clawson, Curt FL-19 Palmer, Gary AL-6
Desantis, Ron FL-6 Pearce, Stevan NM-2
DesJarlais, Scott TN-4 Perry, Scott PA-4
Duncan, Jeff SC-3 Poe, Ted TX-2
Fleming, John LA-4 Posey, Bill FL-8
Franks, Trent AZ-8 Ribble, Reid WI-8
Garrett, Scott NJ-5 Rothfus, Keith PA-12
Gohmert, Louie TX-1 Salmon, Matthew AZ-5
Gosar, Paul AZ-4 Sanford, Mark SC-1
Griffith, Morgan VA-9 Schweikert, David AZ-6
Harris, Andy MD-1 Stutzman, Marlin IN-3
Hice, Jody GA-10 Weber, Randy TX-14
Huelskamp, Tim KS-1 Yoho, Ted FL-3
Jordan, Jim OH-4
Note: The membership of Louie Gohmert during the 114th Congress
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is a topic of debate. While he publicly announced he was joining the HFC
at the start of the 115th Congress, Christine Ayala reports him as a member
in October 2015, in The Dallas Morning News. Since it is difficult to verify
membership, I do not feel comfortable excluding him from my analysis, since
he likely did join at some point during the 114th Congress.
A.0.2 Eigenvector Centrality Scores
I calculated eigenvector centrality scores as a robustness test.1 “Actors
high in eigenvector centrality ... are tied to others who have high degree cen-
trality and thus can also have access to network flows through their indirect
connections” (Smith et al., 2014, 163). This makes sense to measure for the
phenomena I am trying to capture. After calculating these scores, however, it
appeared that this measure was heavily biased toward ranking members who
were receiving a lot of money from a lot of members highly. I have provided
the top 25 eigenvector centrality scores for both networks in Table A.2. Full
tables available upon request.
1Thanks to some thoughtful advice from fellow social network analysis scholars at the
Annual Meeting of the Midwestern Political Science Association in 2017 for this suggestion.
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Table A.2: Eigenvector Centrality Scores
Member 2014 Centrality Member 2016 Centrality
Lee Terry 1 Carlos Curbelo 1
David Jolly 0.949 Bruce Poliquin 0.960
Fred Upton 0.926 Jeff Denham 0.923
Jeff Denham 0.806 Erik Paulsen 0.875
Dan Benishek 0.768 William Hurd 0.687
David Valadao 0.763 Martha McSally 0.678
Tim Walberg 0.728 Lee Zeldin 0.666
Eric Cantor 0.713 David Valadao 0.629
Frank Guinta 0.709 Barbara Comstock 0.574
Lynn Jenkins 0.668 Kevin Yoder 0.573
David Joyce 0.621 Ryan Zinke 0.515
Tom Reed 0.619 John Katko 0.487
Joe Heck 0.582 Ryan Costello 0.450
Elise Stefanik 0.546 David Young 0.445
Michael Grimm 0.509 Elise Stefanik 0.418
Renee Ellmers 0.464 Scott Garrett 0.395
Nan Hayworth 0.413 Frank Guinta 0.367
Bill Shuster 0.412 Bill Shuster 0.363
Reid Ribble 0.396 Mike Bishop 0.360
Scott Rigell 0.393 Darrell Issa 0.355
Mimi Walters 0.389 Joe Heck 0.298
Jason T. Smith 0.356 Tim Walberg 0.293
Ed Royce 0.347 Tim Huelskamp 0.265
Roger Williams 0.341 Richard Hudson 0.251
Tom Latham 0.340 Michael Bost 0.234
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